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The Debtor in this chapter 11 case is The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, the last
four digits of its federal tax identification number are 7437, and its mailing address is 50 North Park Avenue P.O. Box
9023, Rockville Centre, NY 11571-9023.
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The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, the debtor and debtor-inpossession (the “Debtor” or the “Diocese”) in this case, respectfully submits this Reply in further
support of its Motion for an Order Establishing Deadlines for Filing Proofs of Claim and Granting
Related Relief [Dkt. No. 174] (the “Motion”), and in response to the objections and responses filed
by (i) the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”), [Dkt. Nos. 215, 229] (the
“Committee Objection” and the “Committee Reply” respectively); (ii) certain underwriters at
Lloyd’s London and London Market Insurance Companies (collectively, “LMI”), [Dkt. Nos. 199,
232] (the “LMI Objection” and the “LMI Reply” respectively); (iii) Interstate Fire & Casualty
Company (“IFC”) [Dkt. Nos. 200, 233]; (iv) Evanston Insurance Company (“Associated
International”) [Dkt. No. 213]; and (v) Arrowood Indemnity Insurance Company (“Arrowood”)
[Dkt. No. 214] (the “Arrowood Objection”).
INTRODUCTION
1.

The Debtor has worked with the Committee to resolve all but two of the issues

raised by the Committee on this Motion. Most significantly, the Debtor and the Committee now
agree, with the exception of the one issue identified directly below, on the scope and content of
the appropriate direct and publication notice program to notify claimants of the requirement to
submit proofs of claim.
2.

The two issues that remain are the date by which proofs of claim are to be submitted

(the “bar date”) and whether a list of certain accused abusers that the Diocese agrees will be
provided on the claims agent’s website—and a link to the claim’s agent website on the Diocese’s
website—should be accompanied by a picture of those accused individuals. For both of these
issues, the Committee’s proposals reach beyond the bounds of an appropriate notice program as
required by the Bankruptcy Rules and governing case law.

1
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First, as to the bar date, the Second Circuit has made clear that bar dates are to be

set so that claims may be identified with “reasonable promptness.” In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d
115, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added; quoting In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937 F.2d 833, 840 (2d
Cir. 1991)). To accommodate the more extensive, revised notice program agreed to by the
Committee and the Debtor, the Debtor has compromised and is prepared to move forward with
this case with a proposed bar date near the end of May 2021. This nearly 120-day notice period is
far beyond the minimally required 21-days’ notice allowed for by Bankruptcy Rule 2002.
4.

The Committee, however, has proposed a bar date of August 14, 2021, which is

nearly 10 months after the Debtor made its bar date motion and 7 months or about 210 days after
the re-scheduled hearing on this motion. This is almost twice as long as the period required to
effectuate the parties’ agreed-upon notice program. The Committee’s proposed bar date would
unduly delay this case, forestalling by several months the date by which the universe of claimants
is known. This, in turn, will mean long delays before all stakeholders, including the Diocese’s
insurance carriers, can engage in meaningful negotiations and mediation to finalize a proposed
plan for this case and, ultimately, long delays in the resolution of creditors’ claims.
5.

The reason the Committee proposes such a lengthy, 7-month proof of claim process

is that, in the Committee’s view, the date for submitting a simple proof of claim form in this
bankruptcy case should be the same as the revised, current deadline for preparing a complaint and
filing a civil action in state court pursuant to the Child Victims Act (the “CVA”). This is, in effect,
a limitations period. But bankruptcy courts do not allow the end of a limitations period to control
the setting of a bar date. If they did, bar dates would routinely be set years after the filing of a
petition for bankruptcy. There is no reason to allow for the effective limitations period for most
of the claimants in this case to control the setting of the bar date. Courts have made clear that

2
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personal injury claimants are not afforded any special treatment in determining appropriate notice.
Moreover, the reasons that the New York State Legislature extended the CVA deadline by one
year from August 2020 to August 2021 do not apply to the submission of proofs of claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The Legislature was principally concerned with court closures in the New
York State system at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic and allowing for more time necessary
to prepare a complaint to commence a civil action in light of the pandemic. Not only has this
Court remained opened for filings during the pandemic, but far less effort and time (and no lawyer)
is necessary to complete the simple proof of claim form in this case—as to which, as to form, the
Debtor and the Committee agree. For these and other reasons addressed in more detail below, the
Debtor respectfully requests that the Court keep this case on track for prompt resolution by setting
a bar date in May 2021, in accordance with the detailed, extensive, agreed-upon program for
providing direct and publication notice to claimants and potential claimants.
6.

The second issue is that, while the Debtor has agreed with the Committee to provide

a list of certain clergy who have been accused of abuse on the claims agent’s website, the
Committee is insisting that this list also be accompanied by pictures of the accused abusers. The
Committee cannot point to any evidence—and there is none, as its own proffered expert
acknowledges—that these pictures will lead to any increased recall by claimants who, it is worth
noting, would already have been prompted to go to the website and then review the list of accused
individuals provided by the Diocese. There is also no authority of which the Debtor is aware—
and the Committee provides none—that would have the Court impose a form of notice designed
(without evidence) to “cue” claimants’ recall to aid them in determining whether they have a claim
against the Debtor. This is not within the Court’s responsibilities or the proper scope of a program

3
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to notify known and potential creditors of the claims process in accordance with the Bankruptcy
Rules.
7.

Finally, the Debtor addresses the objections by the Diocese’s insurance carriers,

which should be overruled as discussed in more detail below because the insurance carriers are
attempting to graft onto the proof of claim form—which, again, is agreed to by the Debtor and the
Committee—a series of questions that improperly interject issues concerning the insurance
carriers’ defenses that are both not valid and not appropriately raised in connection with a
creditor’s proof of claim against a debtor.
8.

The Debtor, accordingly, respectfully requests that the Court enter the revised,

proposed Bar Date Order attached as Exhibit A to the accompanying Declaration of Todd R.
Geremia. This revised, proposed Order reflects the terms agreed upon by the Committee and the
Debtor concerning the scope of the notice program and additionally incorporates the Debtor’s
positions—as addressed in this Reply—on the remaining issues between the Debtor, the
Committee, and the Debtor’s insurance carriers.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD SET THE BAR DATE IN MAY 2021
A.

Setting a bar date in May 2021 is in the best interest of abuse victims and other
creditors of the Diocese.

9.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall

fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be
filed.” This “bar date” for filing proofs of claim serves as a critical threshold to further progress
in negotiating and confirming a plan of reorganization in this Chapter 11 case and, ultimately, in
compensating abuse victims and other creditors. Bar dates are set to protect the debtor’s and
creditors’ interests. See In re Nutri*Bevco, Inc., 117 B.R. 771, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Bar
4
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dates protect not only the debtor’s interests, but creditors’ interests as well. It establishes a date
by which the plan proponent can determine which liabilities will be asserted against the estate.”).
Here, the Diocese cannot move forward with meaningful discussions regarding the establishment
of a settlement fund to compensate victims, or with respect to the contribution of the Diocese’s
insurance carriers toward such fund, until the bar date has passed and the universe of claimants
and the years and insurance policies implicated by those claims are known. The further progress
of this case thus critically turns on the bar date.
10.

The Committee’s request to extend the bar date into August 2021 will prejudice its

own constituency. By delaying the bar date, the Committee will only stall the progression of the
Chapter 11 process.

As the Committee notes, its constituency includes elderly claimants

(Committee Objection at 11), whose claims in some instances go back several decades, and also
claimants impacted adversely by the COVID-19 pandemic. Adding three months of delay to this
case prejudices those claimants who have stepped forward and who are awaiting the confirmation
of a plan in this Chapter 11 case to achieve a resolution of their claims and, ultimately,
compensation.
11.

Although Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(7) requires as little as 21-days’ notice of an

upcoming claim submission deadline, the Diocese has, from the outset, sought to provide
significantly more notice in this case. A survey comparing the amount of time afforded to
claimants to file proofs of claim in other recent Chapter 11 cases involving large numbers of abuse
claims is attached hereto as Exhibit C. Among the fourteen cases surveyed going back to 2015,
abuse claimants were afforded between 55 and 192 days from the date the bankruptcy court entered
its order setting a bar date to prepare and submit specialized proof of claim forms, with the average

5
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claim submission period being approximately 128 days (just over 4 months).2 In contrast, the
Committee now seeks to establish a bar date that is almost twice the average of the other surveyed
cases and seven months (215 days) from the date of hearing on this motion. The Diocese
respectfully submits that this extended period is unduly long and will only lead to increased costs
to the estate at the expense of victim compensation, as well as potentially jeopardizing the ability
of the Diocese to continue its critical ministries by delaying its emergency from the Chapter 11
process.
B.

Policy considerations that drove the CVA deadline extension are not
applicable here.

12.

In advocating for a bar date more than 210 days after the hearing on this Motion,

the Committee focuses on the deadline for filing a civil action pursuant to the Child Victims Act.
This is, for all intents and purposes, a statute of limitations. Bar dates are not, however, determined
by when statutes of limitations expire on creditors’ claims. The Committee’s position would set a
precedent that would lead to long delays in the resolution of bankruptcy cases.
13.

The Second Circuit has held that, as a “necessary step in achieving the goal of

successful reorganization,” bar dates are to be set so that claims may be identified with “reasonable
promptness.” In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added; quoting In
re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937 F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1991)). In making its extraordinary request for
a bar date nearly seven months out, the Committee focuses on how the vast majority of claimants
here will assert personal injuries. But courts have made clear that “[a] personal injury claimant is
given no special dispensation. The claimant must comply with the Code, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, and court orders for claims handling procedures before there is a valid
2

This survey does not include the 338 day claim submission period set in the chapter 11 case of the Diocese
of Buffalo, New York, which is an outlier. Even if that bar date were included in the survey, the average claim
submission period would still only be 141.9 days.

6
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bankruptcy claim . . . .” In re Best Products Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(citation omitted).
14.

The August 14, 2021 date for filing a civil action pursuant to the CVA does not

support the long delay that the Committee seeks in this case. This date, as noted, is akin to a statute
of limitations for commencing a civil action. And the principal considerations that went into
setting this new date—the time it takes to find a lawyer and prepare a civil action and that, for a
period during the COVID-19 pandemic, the New York State court system was not accepting new
civil actions—do not apply in the context of this Chapter 11 case.3
15.

Other bankruptcy courts have rejected similar attempts to use the CVA deadline for

filing a complaint to dictate a bar date in a bankruptcy case. In the Diocese of Rochester’s Chapter
11 case, for example, Judge Warren denied a motion from the unsecured creditors’ committee to
extend the bar date to make it coterminous with the then-recently enlarged CVA window and in
doing so disposed of many of the same arguments raised by the Committee in its objection here.
See In re the Diocese of Rochester, Case No. 19-20905 (PRW) (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020)
[Dkt. No. 700] (the “Rochester Decision”). In denying the request to extend the bar date in that
case through January 14, 2021, which was a revised deadline for commencing CVA civil actions
set by an Executive Order before the Legislature extended it until August 2021, Judge Warren

3

See Sen. Brad Hoylman, Press Release, Senator Hoylman Responds To Announced Extension Of CVA
Look-Back Window (May 8, 2020) (available at https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/bradhoylman/senator-hoylman-responds-announced-extension-cva-look-back) (The CVA deadline extension “help[s]
make up for lost time while New York’s courts are closed to the filing of new claims. Coming forward as a survivor
of child sexual abuse takes courage, focus and lots of time. As the unemployment rate spikes above 14%, it's
unreasonable to expect survivors of child sexual abuse to do the emotional and legal work necessary to file CVA
lawsuits while simultaneously fighting to pay rent and put food on the table.”); see also Gov. Andrew Cuomo, Press
Release, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Extending Look Back Window for Child Victims Act (Aug. 3, 2020)
(available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-extending-look-back-windowchild-victims-act) (“The Child Victims Act brought a long-needed pathway to justice for people who were abused,
and helps right wrongs that went unacknowledged and unpunished for far too long and we cannot let this pandemic
limit the ability for survivors to have their day in court.”).

7
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expressly noted that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted claimants’ ability to commence new
actions in the New York State court system, which stopped accepting filings in most matters at the
onset of the pandemic, but that the federal bankruptcy court remained open for business
throughout. See Rochester Decision 3-4. Judge Warren also observed that, notwithstanding the
pandemic, between March 16, 2020 and July 29, 2020, 172 abuse claimants had successfully filed
proofs of claim with the debtor’s claims agent. Id. at 4. Ultimately, Judge Warren balanced the
interests of unknown potential claimants against those actual known abuse claimants who had
already filed their proofs of claim, and declined to extend the bar date until the new January 2021
deadline for submitting CVA claims. Id. at 8.4
16.

The Committee accuses the Diocese of asking the Court to “curtail the will of the

legislature and shorten the CVA window that has given survivors hope for justice after decades of
waiting.” Committee Objection at 3. But the New York State Legislature was focused on when
civil actions should be filed and did not purport to address the business of federal bankruptcy courts
in setting a bar date. Here, the Diocese is seeking only what the Second Circuit commands in
setting a bar date pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3): the establishment of a reasonably
prompt deadline for submission of proofs of claim, as this and other courts routinely order in
Chapter 11 cases.
17.

Indeed, bankruptcy courts regularly set a bar date that is shorter, often by years,

than the available time allowed to file suit under the applicable state law statute of limitations. For
instance, the New York Legislature has expressed a clear policy of providing a six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract claims, but no court would take seriously a request to set a bar

4

Judge Warren also did not foreclose the submission of additional abuse claims after the bar date. The court
did, however, correctly hold that any claimant seeking to file a later claim would need to demonstrate “cause” under
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). Id.

8
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date nearly six years into the future so that creditors would be afforded the full period of time
allotted to assert a breach of contract claim in accordance with this limitations period. Judge
Cangilos-Ruiz in the Diocese of Syracuse bankruptcy case made the same observation. See
Syracuse Tr. 42:2 – 42:4 (“[I]n all cases there can be a statute of limitations that’s out there for six
year tort claims where the bar date is not six years.”) (attached as Exhibit D to Geremia Decl.). In
several other bankruptcy cases involving diocesan debtors, the court set or enforced bar dates that
occurred before the civil action filing deadline for bringing a civil action.5
18.

For the same reasons Judge Warren denied the requested bar date extension in the

Rochester Decision, the Committee’s policy arguments in support of extending the bar date to
match the state law deadline to file CVA lawsuits should be rejected. This Court has, despite the
pandemic, remained open and available to litigants. The reduced availability of state courts at the
outset of the COVID-19 pandemic has not, in any way, impacted creditors’ ability to engage in the
simple process of preparing and submitting proofs of claim in this case.
19.

The Diocese’s compromise with respect to the notice program for this case—that

is, the Diocese’s acceptance of certain aspects of the New York-intensive notice program proposed
by the Committee’s expert, Dr. Wheatman—also addresses the second policy concern highlighted
by the Committee: providing abuse victims with sufficient time to emotionally and legally prepare
to file a civil action.
20.

Again, the claimants here will not be filing civil actions in State court but proofs of

claim in bankruptcy court. Far less time is necessary to do “legal preparation” to submit a proof
of claim. The amount of time necessary to complete and return the Diocese’s proposed abuse

5

See Rochester Decision at 8; In re The Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, New York, Case No. 20-30663
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2020) [Dkt. No. 214]; In re The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, Case No. 1530125 (Bankr. D. Minn., April 17, 2015) [Dkt. No. 188].

9
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proof of claim form—which, in addition to soliciting general contact information for each
claimant, consists of a limited number of substantive inquiries regarding the basic facts
surrounding the claim—pales in contrast to the time and effort necessary to investigate and prepare
a civil action and to gather evidence sufficient to meet a plaintiff’s burden of proof at trial.
Plaintiffs seeking to file a lawsuit in state court are generally reliant upon the services of a lawyer
to assist them in drafting papers, navigating court rules and prosecuting their cases, and some
plaintiffs may have been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic in their ability to work with
counsel to properly prepare and prosecute a CVA civil action. By stark contrast to preparing to
commence a civil action, however, the proof of claim form agreed upon by the Diocese and the
Committee here can be easily completed without the need of an attorney or any specialized
knowledge of law or court procedure. Indeed, claimants will have the option to complete and
submit a proof of claim electronically through an interface hosted on the case management website
maintained the Diocese’s claims agent. A May 2021 bar date is more than adequate to allow all
abuse claimants to complete and submit their proofs of claim in this case.
21.

The Diocese acknowledges that, for some abuse victims, emotionally preparing to

confront the details of their abuse in connection with making a claim may be challenging. But, by
contrast to a civil action, the claim submission process in this Chapter 11 case is substantially less
daunting. As an initial matter, even if a plaintiff is granted leave to file a lawsuit under a
pseudonym, the case itself and most pleadings remain open and available to the public which may
deter some victims from pursuing a lawsuit. Proofs of claim alleging sexual abuse submitted in
this case, by contrast, will be kept strictly confidential in accordance with the procedures laid out
in the Diocese’s motion.

10

20-12345-scc

22.

Doc 304

Filed 01/11/21 Entered 01/11/21 16:58:42
Pg 13 of 31

Main Document

Additionally, in a civil action where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, a victim

might hesitate at the prospect of having to provide testimony in discovery or at trial. In the Chapter
11 process, however, once an abuse claimant provides a completed proof of claim, that proof of
claim constitutes prima facie evidence of a valid claim. So long as sufficiently responsive answers
are provided on the form, the likelihood of any need for additional claim discovery or testimony
from victims in this Chapter 11 case is substantially lower than it would be in a CVA civil action.
23.

The Diocese also observes that, by the time the proposed May 2021 bar date occurs,

individuals will have had over two full years from the date the CVA was enacted to contemplate
pursuing their claims. Further, the New York State Legislature may enact a further extension of
the CVA deadline, or even eliminate the statute of limitations altogether as some have advocated.
The Diocese and the Court in this Chapter 11 case cannot be expected to delay progress toward
confirmation indefinitely while awaiting what may be a floating deadline for filing all possible
state court claims.
24.

For all of these reasons, the Court should not delay this case by setting a bar date

nearly seven months from now, in August 2021, but should set a reasonably prompt bar date in
May 2021 which allows for the implementation of the notice program agreed upon by the
Committee and the Diocese. The additional time afforded to plaintiffs to initiate a civil action
pursuant to the CVA should not dictate the date for submitting a far simpler proof of claim form
in this Chapter 11 case. As Judge Warren recognized in the Rochester Decision, in the unlikely
event that the pandemic or other factors present a true barrier to the submission of claims on a
timely basis, claimants may always individually seek to file a late claim pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 3003(c)(3), but the Court should not preemptively delay a resolution for all other claimants
and stakeholders in this case.

11
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C.

Abuse claimants are unlikely to be confused by the multiple deadlines.

25.

The Committee also speculates that abuse claimants may be confused by publicity

of the extension of the CVA deadline which provides that the last date to initiate a lawsuit in New
York state court under the CVA is August 14, 2021. Committee Objection at 11. The Diocese
respectfully submits that, in addition to the publication and dissemination of the bar date notice
proposed by the Diocese, news media coverage and attorney advertising will provide significant
additional advertisement of the bar date in this Chapter 11 case such that potential claimant will
not reasonably be confused about the need to submit a proof of claim or the deadline for doing so.
26.

It is important to recognize that any analysis regarding the efficacy of the

publication of the bar date notice must be limited to the impact of such notice on unknown
creditors. All persons known to the Diocese to have asserted a claim of any kind will receive direct
notice by mail of the bar date. Whether notice is reasonable or adequate depends on whether a
creditor is known or unknown to the Diocese. See Grant v. U.S. Home Corp. (In re U.S.H. Corp.
of NY), 223 B.R. 654, 658 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). “Known” creditors must receive actual notice
of bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 659. By contrast, notice by media publication is sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of due process for “unknown” creditors. See See DePippo v. Kmart
Corp., 335 B.R. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Notice by publication, while not equivalent to actual
service of notice, has been consistently approved by the Supreme Court as comporting with due
process “where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.”
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950). Specifically, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “in the case of persons missing or unknown” employment of
indirect notice via publication “is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to
a final decree foreclosing their rights.” Id.

12
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Here, hundreds of abuse claimants are already known to the Diocese because they

have (i) reported their alleged abuse (either directly or through counsel), (ii) participated in (or
sought to participate in) the Diocese’s well-publicized Independent Reconciliation and
Compensation Program (the “IRCP”), (iii) filed CVA actions against the Diocese prior to the
Petition Date or (iv) filed CVA actions against parishes and other Catholic entities following the
Petition Date, which, but for the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, presumably would have also
named the Diocese as a defendant in such action. The overwhelming majority of these known
claimants are represented by counsel. Each of these known abuse claimants (or, in most cases,
their counsel) will receive a copy of the bar date notice by direct mail which will unambiguously
advise as to the deadline set for the submission of proofs of claim in this case. That direct notice
to known claimants and their counsel should altogether eliminate any concerns of confusion as to
the applicable deadline. There is, in short, no identifiable risk that any of the hundreds of known
abuse claimants will not receive notice of the bar date or will be confused as to the appropriate
deadline to submit their claims.
28.

Also, even if some abuse claimants exist who are unknown to the Diocese, the

robust notice program upon which the Committee and the Diocese now agree will ensure that any
person wishing to assert a claim will be provided with notice and have a full and fair opportunity
to do so. The Committee’s proposed bar date of August 14, 2021 would place the interests of a
likely small pool of individuals ahead of the hundreds of already known abuse claimants who have
a very real interest in achieving a reasonably prompt resolution of their claims. As the Fourth
Circuit observed in Vancouver Women’s Health Soc. v. A.H. Robins Co., a bankruptcy court must
balance the interests of existing claimants and other stakeholders against potential claimants in
connection with notice issues:

13
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In bankruptcy, the court has an obligation not only to the potential
claimants, but also to existing claimants and the petitioner's
stockholders. The court must balance the needs of notification of
potential claimants with the interest of existing creditors and
claimants. A bankrupt estate's resources are always limited and the
bankruptcy court must use discretion in balancing these interests
when deciding how much to spend on notification.
820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoted in In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 140 B.R. 353, 358
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). In that case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court order declining
to extend the bar date on the grounds that sufficient notice had already been provided to unknown
claimants and that an extended bar date would delay the available recovery for those creditors who
had timely submitted claims. Similarly, here, the Committee and the Debtor agree upon a program
that will provide extensive and thorough notice to claimants and the Court should properly account
for the interests of the known abuse claimants in having their claims addressed promptly and reject
the long-delayed bar date sought by the Committee.
D.

Meaningful progress can be made before the CVA window closes.

29.

A reasonably prompt bar date in May 2021 is also instrumental to making

meaningful progress in this case. Establishing the universe of claimants is critical to gathering the
Diocese’s insurance carriers and other stakeholders to start serious work toward achieving a
resolution of this case. The Committee contends to the contrary (Committee Objection at 11-12,
14), by pointing to perceived impediments to achieving a global resolution of claims against
parishes and other non-debtor entities. These concerns are speculative and misplaced.
30.

As discussed above, the history of CVA litigation against the Diocese and the

Diocese’s efforts in connection with the IRCP reflect that the substantial majority of claimants
against the Diocese and its affiliates have already emerged. Moreover, as the experience with
CVA litigation against the Diocese shows, it is highly unlikely that individuals will assert abuse
claims against parishes and non-debtor affiliates of the Diocese without also asserting a claim
14
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against the Diocese. Finally, for the same reasons addressed above, the CVA deadline for filing
civil actions against parishes and other non-debtors should not control the bar date as to the
Diocese. Indeed, non-debtors facing varying limitations periods have contributed to diocesan
settlements and obtained the protection of a channeling injunction when, and if, they substantially
contribute to a settlement. See, e.g., In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., Case No. 0913560 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2011) [Dkt. No. 1471 (order confirming second amended Chapter
11 plan of reorganization including channeling injunction for various non-debtor entities)].
31.

A reasonably prompt bar date in May 2021 for claims against the Diocese will

provide the Diocese and its insurance carriers with critical information regarding the total number
of abuse claims that will need to be addressed in the context of a plan of reorganization, the basic
details of the alleged abuse, and the insurance policies and years implicated by such claims. The
Diocese respectfully submits that these basic elements are necessary to allow for meaningful
negotiations—and, if warranted, mediation—with the insurance carriers regarding the scope and
availability of a pool of insurance coverage, even if additional state court actions against parishes
and other Catholic entities have not yet been fully foreclosed. See In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 937
F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1991) (“To be sure, the amount of the claims may not be finally determined
until adversary proceedings have been concluded, but establishing the identities and interests of
the participants so that the claims-allowance process may begin is an essential function served by
a bar order.”).
E.

A delayed Bar Date will increase costs and dissipate assets that could fund a
plan and support the critical ministries of the Diocese.

32.

In addition to the harm that the hundreds of known abuse victims will suffer from

the delay in resolving their claims, prolonging this Chapter 11 case by implementing an August
14, 2021 bar date will also likely diminish overall victim recovery.
15
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While progress towards a Chapter 11 plan will be stalled until the bar date passes,

the Diocese will nevertheless continue to incur Chapter 11 administrative expenses, including
United States Trustee fees and legal fees for its own counsel and for counsel to the Committee,
dissipating funds that might otherwise be used to satisfy abuse victims. The Diocese has finite
assets. Each month that the Diocese remains in Chapter 11 will (a) diminish the ultimate recovery
for abuse victims, (b) add extensive delays to the resolution of this case and payment of victim
claims, and (c) threaten to weaken and reduce the Diocese’s ability to carry out and support the
important ministries of the Catholic Church on Long Island by delaying the Diocese’s emergence
from bankruptcy.
34.

As the Court is aware, the Diocese is a non-profit organization which is largely

dependent upon donations from the Catholic faithful to support its ongoing good works. The
COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the economy has negatively affected Church finances as
parishioners have not been attending in-person services and in many cases are themselves facing
financial uncertainty. Declaration of Charles Moore, Managing Director of Alvarez & Marsal
North America, LLC, Proposed Restructuring Advisor to The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville
Centre, New York, in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and First Day Pleadings, at ¶ 141–143 [Dkt.
No. 3]. The Diocese has done everything in its power to encourage continued giving. However,
if the bar date is set for August 2021, there will be a long delay in this case and the Diocese has
concerns that public support for the Diocese may erode. Without robust public support, the
Diocese’s ability to continue to carry out its mission through outreach to poor and underserved
communities, and to provide for the pastoral, spiritual and sacramental needs of the Catholic
faithful, will be endangered. Moreover, the Diocese respectfully submits that the communities it
serves are especially in need of the Diocese’s services during the pandemic and in light of the

16
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attendant economic uncertainty. It is, therefore, in the best interests of abuse claimants, the
Diocese, and the Long Island community at large to address any historical liabilities related to
abuse claims, and to have the Diocese exit Chapter 11, as expeditiously as possible. The Diocese
respectfully submits that a bar date of more than seven months from now, as proposed by the
Committee, will negatively impact all parties in interest.
F.

A Bar Date in May 2021 provides the greatest good for the greatest number of
victims.

35.

Finally, while the Diocese respectfully submits that a bar date in May 2021 satisfies

the legal requirement of a reasonably prompt bar date—and an August 14, 2021 bar date does
not—individual claimants may nevertheless seek to have their claims allowed as timely, even after
the bar date, if they can show cause under Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3), or excusable neglect under
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). Rather than extending the bar date for all claimants to allow for such
outliers, which will cause undue delay and additional costs in this Chapter 11 Case, the Diocese
respectfully submits that a more prudent approach is to allow any claimant who can show adequate
cause to move the Court under the appropriate Bankruptcy Rules for an extension of time to submit
his or her individual claim.
II.

THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY THE COMMITTEE IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE OR HELPFUL ON THIS MOTION
36.

In support of its objection, the Committee proffers Dr. Jon Conte as an expert in

bar date notice periods and claim procedures. Dr. Conte has submitted his testimony through a
declaration (the “Conte Declaration”) [Dkt. No. 215 at 60-70], which purports to opine on a wide
range of topics, including the length of time necessary between notice and the bar date, concerns
regarding competing deadlines between the bar date and the CVA deadline, the proper recipients
of direct notice, and the requirements of “fair notice” in the context of abuse survivors.
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A.

There is no basis for Dr. Conte’s testimony on this motion

37.

The Committee does not cite to any legal basis for submitting expert testimony in

connection with a debtor’s motion to establish a bar date, and there is none. The fixing of a bar
date is a matter of law, not one of fact. In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 137 B.R. 679, 680 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1992) (“Debtors’ motion to set a bar date came on for hearing. At that time, the
Committee indicated that it wished to call as a witness its valuation expert.

After due

consideration, we denied the request because we were satisfied that the proposed testimony was
irrelevant to what was before us, and that what was before us was entirely a question of law.”)
(emphasis added).6 Because the establishment of a bar date is a question of law, the Committee
cannot demonstrate that there are “disputed material factual issues” relating to the bar date motion
that permits them to retain experts. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) (“Testimony of witnesses with
respect to disputed material factual issues shall be taken in the same manner as testimony in an
adversary proceeding.”).
38.

In any event, the expert testimony submitted by the Committee should not be

considered on this Motion on a host of alternative grounds. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides
that relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 702 permits
opinion testimony from a “witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

6

Notably, the court in Eagle-Picher, in dealing with unknown/latent asbestos claimants, rejected the
committee’s assertion that establishing a bar date was inequitable, stating that: “The objectives of finality and fixing
the universe of claims permeate the law of bankruptcy, and in achieving those ends, the setting of a bar date is no
more unfair, assuming reasonable notice, than is a statute of limitations, a finality concept firmly embedded in our
legal system generally. Tort claimants can have their right to pursue their claims foreclosed if they fail to take action
before the expiration of a statute of limitations. It is no more unfair to require that they here take action before
expiration of the bar date.” In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 137 B.R. at 682.
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training, or education,” “if (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue (b) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (d) the witness has reliably applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. As the Supreme Court has explained, expert testimony admissible
under Rule 702 “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
39.

Expert testimony must be reliable, which requires the Court to perform “a

preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue.” Id. at 592–93. In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified factors that may bear
upon the reliability of proposed scientific testimony, including:

(1) whether the theory or

technique can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential error rate of the technique; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) whether the technique or
theory has gained widespread acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593–94
(noting that these factors do not constitute “a definitive checklist or test”). A court may apply the
Daubert factors, as appropriate, in cases dealing with technical or “other specialized,” but nonscientific, testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). The purpose of
this analysis is to “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies
or professional experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Id. at 152.
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The party seeking to admit an expert bears the burden of demonstrating

admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. The expert
“may not merely recite a factual narrative that does not draw technical or scientific conclusions.”
In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 558 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). “[S]ubjective or
speculative opinions” are not admissible either. Id. Further, “[a]n expert opinion requires some
explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence
substantiate that conclusion” in order to be admissible. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104,
127 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 552 U.S. 312 (2008). “A minor flaw in an expert’s
reasoning or a slight modification of an otherwise reliable method” does not itself require
exclusion, but exclusion is warranted “if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks good
grounds for his or her conclusions.” Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256,
267 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When presented with an expert opinion
that is not sufficiently grounded in reliable facts, “[a] court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
41.

Dr. Conte’s proffered opinions are not grounded in any disclosed basis or

methodology and fail to meet the evidentiary standards under Daubert. See Conte Decl. ¶¶ 11–
19. Dr. Conte testifies that he bases his opinions on generalized “well-established facts,” Id. ¶ 10,
but he does not offer any studies in support of his opinions or any testable methodology to
distinguish between the adequacies of a shorter and longer bar notice period.7 Dr. Conte admits

7
See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Jon Conte, dated January 8, 2021, 47:12-47:15 (Dr. Conte admits
“[t]here’s no data” to “support [his] view that 70 days is not a sufficient notice period.”) (“Conte Tr.”) (attached as
Exhibit E to Geremia Decl.); Id., 61:8-61:15 (Dr. Conte admits that his opinion that “the bar date in this case should
be the same as the CVA deadline for filing claims” is “based on no testing.”); Id., 48:25-49:10 (Dr. Conte admits he
has no “data to distinguish between the sufficiency of a 90-day period and a 120-day period and a 210-day period,”
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that he cannot say on absolute terms what a proper notice period is.8 Nor does he offer any testable
assertions concerning how extending the bar date by seven months will assist abuse claimants,
how many claimants will benefit from that long extension, or how they will benefit from it.9 In
fact, not only is there no basis underlying Dr. Conte’s testimony, but nothing in it offers a firm
view that any claimants will benefit from the bar date extension; all purported benefits are phrased
in speculative terms such as “may” or “likely.” See, e.g., Conte Decl. ¶¶13, 14, 16, 17, 18. Indeed,
Dr. Conte did not speak to any of the claimants in preparing his opinions,10 let alone specifically
regarding two different dates for submitting proofs of claim in a bankruptcy case.11
42.

Dr. Conte also has no basis to opine on the proposed notice in this case. He is not

an expert on notice procedures.12 He has no experience in designing, developing, analyzing or
implementing legal notice plans.13 “An expert who is qualified in one field cannot offer an opinion
about aspects of the case in another field for which the expert is not qualified—the expert must
stay within the reasonable confines of his subject area and not render expert opinion on an entirely

and he is “not aware of any methodology [] to distinguish between the adequacies of a 90-day notice period, a 120day period, and a 210-day period,” except for his “previous experiences with cases involving victims.”).
8

Id., 46:7-46:11 (Dr. Conte admits that, with respect to “what [] an ideal period of time” is, he “can’t answer
that empirically” or “absolutely”).
9

See, e.g., Id., 67:8-67:19 (Dr. Conte admits that he is unaware of any studies or data to support the view
that “sexual abuse claimants will find it anxiety inducing to have a deadline for submitting a proof of claim that is
different than a state court rule for submitting a claim.”); Id., 68:4-68:23 (Dr. Conte admits that he does not have any
“professional experience in advising or counseling elderly sexual abuse claimants” on which Dr. Conte’s opinion that
the likelihood of confusion is greater for elderly adults is based )
10

Id., 62:16-62:18) (Dr. Conte admits that he has not “worked with a New York plaintiff” in the context of
two different bar dates.).
11

Id. 67:25-68:3 (Dr. admits that he does not “have any experience with claimants in talking to them about
two different dates for submitting claims.”).
12
Id., 41:5-45:4 (Dr. Conte admits he has no “experience in the study of notice plans in connection with court
proceedings,” has “reviewed and commented on issues like definition” but has not done a “formal study per se” on
legal notice plans, does not “hold [himself] out as an expert on providing legal notice in court cases,” and has not
“published any articles regarding the provision of legal notice in court cases.”).
13

Id.
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different field or discipline.” S.E.C. v. Revelation Capital Mgmt, Ltd., 215 F. Supp. 3d 267, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted).
43.

Finally, Dr. Conte’s testimony regarding whether fair notice to abuse survivors is

subject to the “typical abused person” standard or a heightened standard must be stricken. Conte
Decl. ¶¶ 28–29. Expert testimony that states a legal conclusion must be excluded, which has
happened to Dr. Conte previously when he attempted to opine on legal issues. See Terrell C. v.
State Dep’t of Social and Health Servs., 120 Wash App. 20, 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (Dr. Conte
cannot “offer opinions of law in the guise of expert testimony”); Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v.
Schneider, 379 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]t is axiomatic that an expert is not
permitted to provide legal opinions, legal conclusions, or interpret legal terms; those roles fall
solely within the province of the court.”) (citation omitted) (quoted in In re Thilman, 557 B.R. 294,
300 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016)).14 In any event, Dr. Conte’s argument for a “typical abused person”
standard, which is a principal basis for his view endorsing a lengthy notice period here, has no
basis in law.
III.

PHOTOS OF ACCUSED PERPETRATORS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN
THE SEXUAL ABUSE BAR DATE NOTICE
44.

The Debtor has agreed with the Committee to include in the Sexual Abuse Bar Date

Notice a list of the names of certain accused perpetrators. The Committee and Dr. Conte propose
that the Bar Date Notice also include a picture of each accused perpetrator taken at or close to the
time of the alleged sexual abuse, so as to further cue recall and increase responses by survivors.

14

See also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1992) (trial court improperly admitted testimony
defining legal phrase “deadly physical force” in manner inconsistent with applicable definition in New York Penal
Law); United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140, rev'd in part on reh'g on other grounds, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988)
(excluding expert's repeated use of statutory and regulatory language indicating guilt); LinkCo, Inc. v. Fujitsu, Ltd.,
2002 WL 1585551, at*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (excluding expert testimony that “it is my expert opinion that
[defendant] misappropriated trade secrets that originated at [the plaintiff's].”).
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Conte Decl. ¶ 25; Committee Objection at 22. The Court should reject this proposal because it is
not required by due process. And, by Dr. Conte’s own admission there is no methodology, or any
support at all, to show that including pictures with the name list will increase claimant responses,
and if so to what extent.
45.

To the extent the Committee suggests that notice will not be sufficient unless it

includes the pictures of accused perpetrators, whether or not the underlying claims have been
vetted, that is simply not the law. A bar date notice serves to “apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted). Due process is
met as long as “notice is reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties, reasonably conveys
all of the required information, and permits a reasonable amount of time for response.” DePippo
v. Kmart Corp., 335 B.R. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation marks omitted; citing Mullane, 339
U.S. at 314). There is, in particular, no requirement that the bar date notice must also provide
“cues” to potential claimants to assist them in determining whether they have a claim to assert.
Indeed, the Diocese is aware only of one bankruptcy case involving claims of sexual abuse where
the bar date notice included photos of the alleged accusers—and the issue was not contested in that
matter.15
46.

Further, Dr. Conte admits that “there’s no way to know” whether adding pictures

to the name list “will increase the number of potential claimants who may come forward,” other
than the “general supposition” that “the more cues, the more likely it is to stimulate” recall. Conte
Tr. 94:10-94:21. In particular, Dr. Conte agreed that, for those individuals who would already be

15
See Bar Date Order at 16, In re The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Dkt. No.
91, Case No. 20-10846 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2020).
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prompted by a notice to visit the claim’s agent website, there is no way to know how many more
would be “cued” to assert a claim by reviewing pictures on the website in addition to reviewing
the list of accused abusers that the Diocese has agreed it will provide. Conte Tr. 93:15-94:9.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE INSURERS’ OBJECTIONS
47.

The insurers’ objections are meritless and should be overruled.

48.

In LMI’s objection, 16 it requests several revisions to the Bar Date Order,

Confidentiality Agreement, and Sexual Abuse Proof of Claim (“POC”) form: that all of the
Diocese’s insurers receive all Sexual Abuse POC forms and be permitted to use them in their
evaluation of any and all underlying claims—regardless of within which insurance coverage period
the claim allegedly falls (Request Nos. 1 & 2, LMI Objection at 3–4); that the claimant be required
to disclose whether anyone has asserted a related claim on their behalf (Request No. 3(a), LMI
Objection at 4); and that the following question be added to the Sexual Abuse POC form:
Please provide all facts you are aware of that suggest that the
Diocese, or any of its officers or employees, knew or should have
known that the abuser was abusing you or others before or during
the period of time when the abuse or other wrongful conduct took
place.
(Request No. 3(b), LMI Objection at 4).
49.

Arrowood also filed an objection, in which it proposed the addition of the following

question to the Sexual Abuse POC form:
Have you previously filed a lawsuit, made a claim, or filed a proof
of claim concerning sexual abuse you suffered that was committed
by any other individual entity, other than an abuser affiliated with a
church, parish, school, or Diocesan organization? If so, please state
the date(s) of abuse, abuser and his/her affiliated employer/entity.
Arrowood Objection at 2.

16

IFC and Associated International joined in LMI’s objection. See Dkt. Nos. 200, 213.
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50.

These objections are misplaced and should be overruled.

A.

The insurers are not entitled to Sexual Abuse POC forms that fall outside
their coverage period.

51.

The Debtor has proposed in its proposed bar date order that each of its insurers

should receive Sexual Abuse POC forms for claims that allege sexual abuse during time periods
that the insurer provided coverage to the Debtor. See Ex. A at 7 ¶ 15(c)(iv), Geremia Decl.
Because the Debtor’s insurers provided coverage to the Debtor during discrete time periods, claims
that allege the occurrence of sexual abuse when a particular insurer did not provide coverage to
the Debtor fall outside the scope of such insurer’s coverage. See Adversary Proceeding No. 2001227, Dkt.. No. 1 Ex. A (list of insurance policies and their respective policy periods). The
Debtor is under no obligation to provide Sexual Abuse POC forms on a universal basis to all
insurers, and LMI has not provided any reason why it is entitled to Sexual Abuse POC forms that
fall outside their coverage period. The Court should thus deny LMI’s request for information that
is otherwise irrelevant to its insurance coverage and should approve the Debtor’s proposed
framework.
B.
52.

The insurer’s proposed questions for the proof of claim form are
irrelevant, unnecessary and burdensome.
The Debtor also joins in the Committee’s Objection and Reply to the insurers’

objections with respect to the additional questions regarding the Diocese’s knowledge of abuser’s
conduct and unrelated abuse. [Dkt. Nos. 215 at 25-26, 229].17
53.

Because Sexual Abuse Claims differ from other claims that may be filed against

the Debtor, the Debtor proposed a customized form for Sexual Abuse Claims in lieu of the Official

17

For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor does not join in the Committee’s Objection and Reply to the extent
any position therein is inconsistent with the Debtor’s position in the Motion and this Reply. In addition, the Debtor
does not join in the Declaration of Jon R. Conte, Ph.D. in support of the Committee Reply, to the extent Dr. Conte
offers legal opinions therein. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 229 at 11–12.
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Form contemplated by Bankruptcy Rule 3001. See Motion at 9–10. Although this Sexual Abuse
Proof of Claim Form varies from the Official Form, it should not be deemed to create an
opportunity for insurers to interject irrelevant, unnecessary or otherwise burdensome questions.
54.

LMI’s proposed question regarding the Diocese’s knowledge of abuser’s conduct

implies that if the Diocese was aware of abuse by anyone of anyone, at any time prior to the abuse
at issue, then abuse of anyone by anyone thereafter was expected or intended by the Diocese. See
LMI Objection at 5 (citing Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th
Cir. 1996)). LMI is in essence seeking inclusion of this question in the Sexual Abuse POC Form
as part of its defense to coverage, and to the extent LMI may gather information from answers to
this question demonstrating that injuries alleged by victims of sexual abuse were expected or
intended by the Diocese, LMI will likely take the position that no coverage would be afforded
under the relevant insurance policies.
55.

This contentious question should not be included in the Sexual Abuse POC form.

As an initial matter, it goes to the merits of a non-party’s defense and is unnecessary for the Sexual
Abuse POC form to be deemed a prima facie claim against the Diocese in the first instance. In
any event, the question is improper because LMI’s position with respect to its coverage defense is
inconsistent with New York law. The New York Court of Appeals has held that negligence in
hiring or retaining an employee who commits a sexual assault constitutes an “occurrence” that is
not “expected or intended” from the standpoint of the insured. See RJC Realty Holding Corp. v.
Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 2 N.Y.3d 158 (2004). In the context of a suit against a massage parlor,
the court explained that if the allegation of sexual abuse is true, the masseur “departed from his
duties for solely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of [RJC’s] business.” Accordingly,
the court did not ascribe the masseur’s expectations or intentions to his employer in determining
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the applicability of the insurance policy. Id. at 164. The same is true in the actions brought against
the Diocese under the Child Victims Act.
56.

LMI cites to a lengthy block quote in In re Residential Capital, LLC, 518 B.R. 720,

731 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), for the proposition that “without the [additional question], the
claimants will not allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” LMI
Reply at 4–5. But LMI conveniently omits from its discussion the following paragraph in In re
Residential Capital, which preceded LMI’s block quote:
Claims objections have a shifting burden of proof. Correctly filed
proofs of claim constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and
amount of the claim. To overcome this prima facie evidence, an
objecting party must come forth with evidence which, if believed,
would refute at least one of the allegations essential to the claim. By
producing evidence equal in force to the prima facie case, an
objector can negate a claim's presumptive legal validity, thereby
shifting the burden back to the claimant to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that under applicable law the claim should be
allowed. If the objector does not introduce evidence as to the
invalidity of the claim or the excessiveness of its amount, the
claimant need offer no further proof of the merits of the claim.
Id. at 731 (alterations, citations and quotation marks omitted).
57.

Arrowood’s proposed question regarding unrelated abuse similarly asks for

information that is beyond the scope of any claimant’s allegations against the Debtor. Relevant
questions in a POC form that this Court should approve are questions that help determine whether
the claimant has a valid claim against the Debtor. Questions that ask for information about other
potential abuse claims that a claimant may have asserted against other individuals or entities are
outside the scope of any potential claims against the Debtor and should not be included in the
Sexual Abuse POC form.
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CONCLUSION
The Debtor therefore respectfully requests that the Court: (i) enter the revised Bar Date
Order attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Todd R. Geremia submitted with this Reply, and
(ii) grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.
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